Washington, DCThe expected testimony on Thursday of BP Chief Executive Tony Hayward before the Congressional Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will be closely watched, in light of the damning revelations recently summarized in the New York Times.
It appears that the well, which has spilled millions of gallons of crude into the Gulf of Mexico since April 20, was destined to fail thanks to a series of shortcuts and miscues, not to mention the fact that the well was more than a month behind schedule.
On June 14 the New York Times revealed that the Deepwater Horizon, owned by Transocean and leased to BP at a cost of a half million dollars per day plus contractors' fees, was 43 days late for its next scheduled drilling location.
A communiqué forwarded to BP Oil by the leaders of a House committee on June 14 cited internal BP documents showing a pattern of high-risk choices made in an apparent effort to save time and money in the weeks leading up to the disastrous explosion and oil spill in April.
Among the allegations, BP opted to utilize a faster and less expensive design for the final string of casing that came in at $7 to $10 million less than a preferred method. The "tapered string" method afforded less protection against a poor cementing job and the possibility of gas rising up the well.
The latter decision allowed for only two barriers to upward gas flow that could swell to cause an eventual blowout: cement near the bottom and a seal assembly near the top. Even so, Congressional leaders allege that BP chose not to use a "lockdown sleeve" to ensure that the top seal would hold.
As for the cement, BP decided to use fewer centralizer devices to keep the final string of casing centered in the well hole. It has been reported that the cement contractor, Halliburton, recommended the use of 21 centralizers. BP elected instead to use only six.
An email from a BP official dated April 16—four days before the blowout—complained about the time it would take to install the recommended number of devices.
The congressmen allege that BP also failed to circulate heavy drilling mud through the well before going ahead with the cement job. It has been reported that the American Petroleum Institute recommends full circulation prior to cement work in an effort to reduce the possibility that mud will contaminate the cement and compromise its strength. The time required to circulate the heavy drilling mud according to recommendations was 12 hours.
It has also been alleged that BP decided not to proceed with a test that would verify the soundness of the cement. The Times reported yesterday that BP's own engineers ran computer models suggesting a good cement job was unlikely. A crew from Schlumberger Ltd., a company specializing in cement bond log tests, was on hand to conduct the necessary tests that would vouch for the strength, or lack thereof, of the cement job.
The test would have taken an additional 12 hours. BP elected not to proceed. The crew from Schlumberger vacated the Deepwater Horizon the morning of April 20, just hours before the disastrous blowout that killed 11 and injured several.
The documents afford the strongest evidence yet that BP had the greater hand in the Gulf of Mexico oil spill.
Tony Hayward testifies on June 17. Representative Bart Stupak (D-Michigan) chairs the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Stupak, along with Henry Waxman (D-California) were the authors of the communiqué sent to BP June 14, in advance of Thursday's hearing.
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